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In a variable supply auction the seller determines the quantity to be sold after observing
the bids. This form of trade has recently gained popularity in a variety of markets, e.g.
markets for electricity, emission permits and initial public o®erings (IPOs), yet it is most
common in Treasury auctions. As noted by Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002),
the Treasury departments of many countries, e.g. Switzerland, Mexico, Sweden, Finland,
Germany, Norway, Italy,1 adjust the quantity to be issued in response to the bidding in
their regular auctions for government debt. Despite the regularity of these auctions and
the high volumes traded, little is known about how ex post variations of supply a®ect
bidding.
In this paper we examine a simple model of a variable supply auction. We explore how
rational bidders behave in the uniform price and the discriminatory auction when supply
is uncertain and depends on the submitted bids. Our analysis provides a ranking of these
two commonly used auction formats in terms of revenue for the seller and average trading
volume.
We assume that a single seller with constant marginal cost of production o®ers multiple
units of a good to two or more buyers in an auction. Buyers are risk neutral and face
uncertainty about the marginal cost of the seller. In the ¯rst stage of the game, bidders
simultaneously submit their individual bids for one unit to the auctioneer. In the second
stage of the game, given the received bids and the production cost, the seller decides
on the supply quantity so as to maximize pro¯t. We study two types of auctions. In
the discriminatory auction, the seller acts as a perfectly discriminating monopolist with
respect to the received bids, and in the uniform price auction the seller charges all winning
bidders the same price determined by the lowest winning bid.2
We show that in every symmetric (mixed strategy) equilibrium buyers bid higher in
the uniform price auction with a probability of one. In the two-bidder case this result
holds for all rationalizable bids. As a result, the uniform pricing leads to higher expected
revenue for the seller. We also ¯nd (under a convexity condition) that the uniform price
auction generates higher average trade volume.
At ¯rst sight these results might seem counterintuitive: standard monopoly theory
tells us that a price discriminating monopolist sells a higher quantity and realizes higher
pro¯ts. The major di®erence here, of course, is that bidders are strategic when submitting
1See Heller and Lengwiler (2001), Umlauf (1993, pp. 316{317), Nyborg et al. (2002), Keloharju,
Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005) and Rocholl (2004) for descriptions of the Treasury auction procedures in
Switzerland, Mexico, Sweden, Finland and Germany, respectively. In these countries the Treasuries use a
discriminatory auction and determine supply ex-post. Scalia (1997) and Bjonnes (2001) report that the
Treasury auctions in Norway and Italy, respectively, are uniform price auctions with variable supply.
2In some versions of the uniform price auction the winning bidders pay the highest losing bid, but this
method does not seem to have relevance in practice and we do not consider it further here.
2their bids. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, when bidders anticipate price discrimination,
they will adjust their bids accordingly so as to counterbalance the discriminatory power
of the seller. We show here that the commitment not to price discriminate in the uniform
price auction will promote competition among bidders and eventually raise bid prices. As
a consequence, the seller will be able to charge higher prices and sell a higher quantity.
The results of our model could serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, it o®ers
a possible explanation of the recent empirical ¯ndings on Treasury auctions which are
largely in support of uniform pricing (see Goldreich 2007, Malvey and Archibald 1998,
Umlauf 1993). On the other hand, and more importantly, it could serve as a guide for
future empirical research by hypothesizing that supply uncertainty causes bids to rise more
in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. For instance, Nyborg
et al. (2002, p.422) have already conjectured that bidder reaction to supply uncertainty is
re°ected in the empirical data on bidding, yet so far it has been unclear how these e®ects
might work under the two pricing rules.
To gain intuition into how supply uncertainty a®ects bids in our model, we explore
how increasing a bid in°uences the chances of winning and the payment of a bidder in
uniform price and discriminatory auctions. We observe that, for both pricing rules, raising
a bid raises the probability of winning. Increasing a bid, however, is less costly in the
uniform price auction: whereas in the discriminatory auction winning bids are paid with
a probability of one, in the uniform price auction all winners pay the lowest winning bid.
So, in the uniform price auction, bidders with higher bids free ride on their lower bidding
counterparts since all bidders pay the same amount. However, by submitting higher bids
bidders can avoid (part of) the risk of not being served in the cases of high marginal cost
in which there will be a reduction in supply. In equilibrium this creates a tendency for
higher bidding in the uniform price auction.
Most closely related to our framework is the model of Lengwiler (1999), where bidders'
uncertainty about seller's marginal cost is modelled in a similar fashion. Yet, Lengwiler
restricts bidders' choice to the announcement of bid quantities at two exogenously given
prices { high and low. He proved that the uniform price and the discriminatory auc-
tions have perfect equilibria. Since the characterization of equilibria in such a setting is
rather di±cult, both auctions could not be compared in terms of revenue for the seller or
e±ciency.
There are two reasons why we reach here more de¯nitive conclusions about revenue and
e±ciency. First, we focus on prices, which allows us to more closely examine the tradeo®
between probability of winning and payment. Second, we utilize a new methodological
approach. We identify bounds on the set of rationalizable bids in the two-bidder case and
the set of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria in the more-than-two-bidder case. This
allow us to compare the two auctions without the need to solve explicitly for the equilibria,
3which seems technically unfeasible even in this relatively simple model.
The theoretical literature on ¯xed supply multi-unit auctions is in favor of discrimi-
natory pricing. The primary concern with the uniform price auction is the existence of
low-price equilibria. Back and Zender (1993) extend a model ¯rst introduced by Wilson
(1979) and demonstrate that there are low-price equilibria in which bidders submit kinked
demand schedules. Wang and Zender (2002) ¯nd that, if submission of non-competitive
bids is allowed, the uniform price auction always has equilibria with lower expected rev-
enues than the equilibria of the discriminatory auction. Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004)
develop a model allowing for short squeezes, and show that the discriminatory auction
leads to more short squeezing and higher revenue than the uniform price auction.
In all these models there is no strategic role for the seller. This element, in contrast,
is central to the auction games presented here and we demonstrate how it reverses the
auction ranking in a strategic bidding model. Moreover our analysis does not rely on the
standard argument that the uniform price auction weakens the winner's curse in common
value auctions (see, e.g. Milgrom and Weber 1982), and yet the uniform price auction is
found to be superior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions of the model
and the theoretical framework. Analysis and results are in Section 3. Section 4 explores to
what extent the results are applicable in more general settings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
A monopoly seller o®ers multiple units of an asset to n ¸ 2 prospective buyers. The asset
has common value to buyers denoted by v and the seller has no information about that
common value.3 The seller will use a variable supply auction to sell the good. Each buyer
i 2 f1;2;:::;ng is risk neutral and submits a price bid for a single unit. The monopolist
observes privately his constant marginal cost c, only the distribution of which is known
to bidders. This distribution has support [0;c], where c ¸ v. The distribution function is
denoted by F(c) and its density function by f(c). The latter is taken to be continuous,







3A fully satisfactory approach would probably require that bidders have di®erent privately observed
signals of that common value. We will see that even in this simple model signi¯cant complexities arise
especially in the analysis of the uniform price auction. Later we discuss that our results are robust to
small asymmetries in the valuations of bidders, so this assumption is made primarily for notational clarity
(for similar approach see e.g. Back and Zender 2001, Kremer and Nyborg 2004, McAdams 2007).
4is a monotonically decreasing function.4 We assume also that bidders are not able to pay
in¯nitely large bid prices, that is, bids are restricted to an interval [0;m], where m > v is
an arbitrarily large, but ¯nite number.
In a variable supply auction, after receiving the bids, the seller decides on supply
quantity so as to maximize pro¯t. We model this scenario as a two-stage game. The
payo®s of the players depend on the bids, the supply quantity and the payment rule of
the auction. We ¯rst introduce some general notation for the players' payo®s and provide
standard de¯nitions of equilibrium and rationalizability for an arbitrary variable supply
auction game. Then we specify these payo®s separately for the uniform price and the
discriminatory auction.
Pure strategies
Each bidder i submits a price bid xi to the auctioneer, indicating the (highest) price he is
willing to pay for a unit. The vector of submitted bids is denoted by x and the bid vector
of all bidders except bidder i by x¡i. Let us consider an arbitrary trade mechanism. Since
the seller can condition the supply on the received bids, his strategy is a mapping from
the set of bid vectors and possible values of the privately observed marginal cost c into
supply quantity:
Á: [0;m]
n £ [0;c] ! f0;1;2;::;ng:
Assume that, after observing bids x and marginal cost c, the seller supplies quantity q.
We denote seller's pro¯t by rS(x;q;c) and the payo® (or the net consumer surplus) of
bidder i by ri(x;q). If the seller supplies according to the strategy Á(¢), the expected










A mixed strategy ¾i of bidder i is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies
[0;m]. The set § of mixed strategies is the set of probability distributions de¯ned on
([0;m];B), where B is the Borel ¾-¯eld on [0;m]. A mixed strategy pro¯le of all bidders
is denoted by ¾ and a mixed strategy pro¯le of all fellow bidders of bidder i by ¾¡i. The
4This property of the distribution implies \monotone hazard rate", which is standard in auction
theory. It guarantees in single-unit ¯rst-price auctions that bidders with higher valuations submit higher
bids. It is satis¯ed by most common distributions: uniform, normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential
and Laplace. See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a more complete list and for results allowing the
identi¯cation of distributions with monotone hazard rates.


















We will focus on the subgame perfect equilibria in the general case and on rationalizable
strategies in the special case of two bidders.
De¯nition 1 (subgame perfect equilibrium). The mixed strategy pro¯le ¾¤ and the supply
function of the seller Á¤ constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium (short: equilibrium), if
the following conditions (SS) and (MS) hold.
Second stage
For every vector of declared bids x and every value of the marginal costs c, the auc-






In the ¯rst stage of the game the strategy of every bidder i maximizes his expected payo®,









¤) 8¾i 2 §: (MS)
Reduced game
We will further on consider only optimal behavior of the seller in the second stage of the
trade mechanisms we analyze. From now on we will, therefore, write
Ri(¾i;¾¡i) instead of Ri(¾i;¾¡i;Á
¤);
always assuming that the seller supplies a pro¯t maximizing quantity. We will similarly use
Ri(xi;x¡i) instead of Ri(xi;x¡i;Á¤) and RS(¾;c) instead of RS(¾;Á¤(x;c);c). Condition
(MS) requires that bidders' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in the reduced game.
6De¯nition 2 (rationalizable strategies). Let §0




















¡i stands for the convex hull of the set §
k¡1
¡i ; i.e. the smallest convex set that









The rationalizable (or strategically sophisticated) strategy pro¯les are (mixed) strategy
pro¯les which survive the serial deletion of strategies not belonging to the best responses
of the players. Obviously, in a symmetric game the sets of rationalizable strategies for all
players are equal. For notational brevity we will, therefore, omit the index i and write
§rat instead of §rat
i . The set of rationalizable strategies and the set surviving the iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies coincide in two-player games.6 This property will
be useful later on when discussing the implications of Theorem 4.
3 Analysis of the uniform price and the discrimina-
tory auction
In both the uniform and the discriminatory auction the seller orders the bids in a descend-
ing order and serves them until the supply q is exhausted. Whereas in the uniform price
auction all winning bidders pay a price equal to the lowest winning bid (called stopout
price), in the discriminatory auction all winners are charged their own bid prices. Let us
introduce some additional notation to describe the players' payo®s. Take an arbitrary bid
5For brevity and ease of access, we stick to the de¯nition and the notation of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, p. 49, De¯nition 2.3). Although this de¯nition does not introduce the notion of a belief system
as the original de¯nition does (see Bernheim 1984, pp. 1013{1014, De¯nitions 3.1{3.3), it is equivalent
to Bernheim's (1984) de¯nition. The only di®erence is that Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) consider only
games with a ¯nite strategy space (see also Pearce 1984), whereas Bernheim (1984), similarly to the
model presented here, considers a more general strategy space, which is a compact subset of an Euclidean
space.
6Easily accessible proofs can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 51{52) and Pearce (1984,
pp. 1048{1049, Appendix B, Lemma 3). These proofs are conducted for games with ¯nite strategy
spaces, but the claim is also valid for the compact strategy sets of our model (for this argument consult
Bernheim 1984, p. 1016).
7vector x. Order the bids in a descending order. For that purpose de¯ne the function
'x : f1;2;:::;ng ! f1;2;:::;ng;
where 'x(j) = k, if bidder j submitted the k-th highest bid. If two or more bids are






where ¿k(x) is the k-th highest bid if the bids are ordered in a descending order. The







v ¡ ¿q(x) for 'x(i) · q,
0 for 'x(i) > q.







v ¡ xi for 'x(i) · q,
0 for 'x(i) > q.


















Next we start with the analysis of the two auctions.
Discriminatory auction (D)
Theorem 1. The rationalizable strategy set §D of the discriminatory auction contains a
unique strategy for each bidder. This is a pure strategy in which every bidder submits the
bid zD, which is de¯ned by the unique solution of the equation




This is graphically illustrated in Figure 1. The proof of this theorem is quite straight-
forward due to the linear production cost assumption. In the discriminatory auction the
seller is acting as a perfectly discriminating monopolist with respect to the submitted
8bids. Since all winning bidders have to pay their bids, all bids which exceed (or are at











Figure 1: zD and zU are the unique solutions of the equations (D) and (U) (see Theorem 1
and Theorem 2).
The optimal supply quantity of the seller takes the form
Á
¤
D(x;c) = maxfk : ¿k(x) ¸ cg:









v ¡ xi for xi ¸ c,
0 for xi < c.
The payo® of each bidder is independent of the other bids. The expected consumer surplus
of bidder i is thus
R
D
i (x) = (v ¡ xi)F(xi):
From the ¯rst order condition it follows that the maximizer zD is the unique solution of
equation (D). Existence and uniqueness8 of zD follow from the assumption that F(c) is
log-concave. In the bidding stage of the game, the bid zD is a strongly dominant strategy
7In fact the auctioneer is indi®erent between selling or not selling units to bidders who quoted a price
equal to marginal cost. This detail is not important here as such an event happens with zero probability
because the distribution F(c) is atomless.
8Consider the function G(z) = v ¡ z ¡
F(z)
f(z). Observe that G(0) = v > 0 and G(v) = ¡
F(v)
f(v) < 0 (F is
log-concave). The continuity of G(z) guarantees that the equation G(z) = 0 has a solution in the interval
(0;v) (by the Intermediate Value Theorem). The log-concavity of F requires that
F(z)
f(z) is a monotonically
increasing function, therefore G(z) is strictly monotonically decreasing. Thus the equation G(z) = 0 has
a unique solution.
9for each player.9 Since the payo® of each bidder is independent of how other buyers bid,
there is indeed no competition in the discriminatory auction. Moreover, as all bidders
have the same valuation for the good, they submit equal bids, and price discrimination
does not materialize. As we will show, in the same scenario the uniform price auction
promotes competition among bidders.
Uniform price auction (U)
The two bidder case
In this case x = (x1;x2), and with the notation we introduced ¿1(x) = maxfx1;x2g;





> > > <
> > > :
0 for q = 0,
¿1(x) ¡ c for q = 1,
2(¿2(x) ¡ c) for q = 2.
Second stage:





> > > <
> > > :
0 for c > ¿1(x),
1 for ¿1(x) > c > 2 ¢ ¿2(x) ¡ ¿1(x),
2 for 2 ¢ ¿2(x) ¡ ¿1(x) > c.
The equalities occur with probability 0 and are therefore omitted.
First stage:







(v ¡ xi) ¢
¡
F(xi) ¡ F(2x¡i ¡ xi)
¢
+ (v ¡ x¡i) ¢ F(2x¡i ¡ xi) for xi ¸ x¡i,
(v ¡ xi) ¢ F(2xi ¡ x¡i) for xi < x¡i.
(3.1)
The next Theorem establishes several important properties of the expected payo® func-
tion. See Figures 1 and 2 for graphical illustrations of these properties.
9Bidding zD maximizes the the buyer's expected surplus, so one might be tempted to think that
the seller expected revenue must be minimal for the discriminatory auction. As we will see, however,
these auctions are not zero-sum games because they lead to di®erent average trading volumes, and thus
di®erent social surplus. So, a ranking cannot be provided on the basis of such an argument.




denotes the partial derivative from above with respect to xi:
(i) RU
i (xi;x¡i) is continuous in (xi;x¡i);
(ii) RU




i (xi;x¡i) > 0 for xi = x¡i < v,
(iv) @iRU
i (xi;x¡i) > 0 for
x¡i
2 < xi < minfx¡i;zUg, where zU is the unique solution
of the equation







(v) There exists ± > 0 such that
@iR
U
































































i Ri(¢) > 0
@
+
i Ri(¢) = 0
Figure 2: In the dash-line area the payo® of bidder i is zero (see property (ii)). In the vector
area the bidder's payo® increases in the direction of the arrows (see properties (iii),
(iv) and (v)).
Proof.
Statements (i) and (ii) follow directly from equation (3.1). To prove (i) observe that for
xi = x¡i both lines in (3.1) are equal to (v¡xi)¢F(xi): The intuition behind (ii) is simple.
If 0 · xi · x¡i=2, it is not pro¯table for the seller to service bidder i for any realization
of the marginal cost c, which means that with a probability of one bidder i is not served.
11To prove statement (iii) note that for xi = x¡i we obtain
@i+R
U
i (xi;x¡i) = (v ¡ xi) ¢ (f(xi) + f(2x¡i ¡ xi)) ¡ F(xi)
+ F(2x¡i ¡ xi) ¡ (v ¡ x¡i) ¢ f(2x¡i ¡ xi)
= (v ¡ xi) ¢ f(xi) > 0:
Statement (iv) follows from the (in)equalities
@iR
U
i (xi;x¡i) = (v ¡ xi) ¢ f (2xi ¡ x¡i) ¢ 2 ¡ F (2xi ¡ x¡i)
= 2f (2xi ¡ x¡i)
h
(v ¡ xi) ¡
F (2xi ¡ x¡i)
2f (2xi ¡ x¡i)
i
> 2f (2xi ¡ x¡i)
h




> 2f (2xi ¡ x¡i)
h





Notice that the last two inequalities apply because, as assumed, F
f is a monotonically
increasing function. A rigorous proof of property (v) can be found in Appendix A. Here
we illustrate only the main idea. We exploit the already established properties (i) and
(iii) and the fact that pre-images of open sets under continuous mappings are open to
reach the conclusion that in an open neigborhood around the set
f(xi;x¡i) j xi = x¡i < zUg
the partial derivative from above with respect to xi is positive. The claim follows.
As a consequence of Theorem 2 and equation (3.1) we obtain the statement:
Corollary 1. The (pure strategy) best response correspondence x¤
i of each bidder i, has
the following properties:





i (0) = fzDg; (3.3)
xi < v for all xi 2 x
¤
i (v). (3.4)
Proof. (3.2) follows from (iii); (3.3) and (3.4) follow from (3.1).
(3.2) implies that the uniform price auction has no symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in pure strategies. (3.3) and (3.4) further imply that the best response correspondence
is not continuous, which points to the generic di±culty for the existence of pure strategy
equilibria. Indeed, if the best response were continuous, it should cross the 45± line, which
does not happen here because of (3.2). In subsection 3 we calculate the best response for
12an example of uniformly distributed marginal cost. See Figure 6 for an illustration of the
best response correspondences for that numerical example. The next Theorem provides
an equilibrium existence result.
Theorem 3 (equilibrium existence). The uniform price auction has a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
Proof. The existence is guaranteed by Glicksberg's (1952) theorem, since the expected
payo® function RU
i (xi;x¡i) is continuous (see property (i)) and the support [0;m] of the
bids is a convex and compact set.
Theorem 4 (rationalizable strategies). The set of rationalizable strategies of the uniform





= 1 for all ¾ 2 §
U:
As remarked earlier, the Theorem applies also for the sets of mixed strategies which
survive the serial deletion of strongly dominated strategies. One can easily check10 that
zU > zD; therefore, it follows from Theorems 1 and 4 that the rationalizable bids in the
uniform price auction are (almost surely) higher than those in the discriminatory auction.
Before providing a proof of Theorem 4, let us explain why rational players bid higher
in the uniform price auction. Consider the case in which bidder i submitted a bid at
least as high as his fellow bidder (xi ¸ x¡i) and let us compare the changes in his payo®
resulting from an increase of his bid under the two pricing rules. In both auction formats
the winning probability F(xi) will clearly increase equally. While in the discriminatory
auction the bidder has to pay his new bid with a probability of one, in the uniform price
auction he pays on average less: he pays the bid price of his fellow bidder when both
bidders are served. In this case, increasing his bid is more pro¯table (or at least less
unpro¯table) under the uniform pricing rule. Consider now the case (xi < x¡i): In this
scenario bidder i is served with higher probability under the discriminatory than under
the uniform price auction: F(xi) > F(2xi ¡x¡i): Therefore, in the uniform price auction
this bidder will want to compensate for this lower probability by increasing his bid. This
very characteristic of the uniform price payment rule creates incentives for higher bidding.
We now move on to provide the main idea of the proof of the Theorem 4. The rigorous
but more technical proof can be found in Appendix A.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 4 (rationalizable strategies).
It is intuitive that rational players do not bid higher than their valuation (see Part 1 of
the proof in Appendix A). The more interesting part is to show that bidders do not bid
10This follows directly from the fact that zD solves equation (D), zU solves equation (U), and F(c) is
log-concave (see Figure 1).
13below zU: Property (v) of Theorem 2 reads:
There exists ± > 0 such that
@iR
U
i (xi;x¡i) > 0 for x¡i < xi < minfx¡i + ±;zUg:
This property is depicted in Figure 2, where we can see that in a small neighborhood
above the 45± line the payo® of bidder i is increasing in his bid. We use now this property
to state:





= 0 for all ¾ 2 §
U:
The proof of this statement is relegated to Appendix A (see Part 2 of the proof therein).
The idea is to divide the interval [0;zU) into small intervals of length ± (in the sense of
statement (v) of Theorem 2), where zU=± = N is an integer number. We denote the
intervals
Ik = [(k ¡ 1) ¢ ±;k ¢ ±) for k = 1;2;:::N; I0 = ;;
as illustrated in Figure 3. By an iterative procedure we show that mixed strategies placing
positive probability on I1;I2;:::;IN are not rationalizable. For that purpose we use the
properties of bidders' payo® functions as stated in Theorem 2.
The general case
In this subsection we discuss the case in which an arbitrary number of n ¸ 2 bidders
participate in the uniform price auction. We formally derive bidders' payo® function and
show that it is continuous in the vector of declared bids (see Lemma 1). This ¯nding is
used to verify that the uniform price auction has a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
(Theorem 5).
We further prove that in a symmetric equilibrium bids in the uniform price auction are
with a probability of one higher than bids in the discriminatory auction (Theorem 6).
First, we derive bidders' payo® function. Let x be an arbitrary bid vector and q;q0 2














































Figure 3: The dark colored rectangle depicts the boundaries of the support of the rationalizable
strategies in the uniform price auction. The triangles illustrate the serial elimination
of mixed strategies placing positive probability on the intervals I1;I2;:::;IN.









q¡q0 for q < n,
0 for q = n.









q¡q0 for q ¸ 1,
c for q = 0.
So, the seller optimally supplies the quantity q for c 2 [c¡
q ;c+
q ]. The set of winners is then
©
j j 'x(j) · q
ª
, and all winners pay the stopout price ¿q(x). The expected payo® of an



































15is the probability that exactly q units are sold. Now we can state:
Lemma 1 (continuity). RU
i (x) is continuous in x:
See Appendix A for a proof.
Theorem 5 (existence). The uniform price auction has a symmetric mixed strategy equi-
librium.
The Theorem follows immediately from Becker and Damianov (2006). There it is
shown that symmetric games with continuous payo®s and compact and convex strategy
spaces possess symmetric mixed strategy equilibria. Now we can formulate our main
result for the general case:
Theorem 6. In every symmetric equilibrium ¾¤
U of the uniform price auction, bids are








Sketch of the proof. Although the idea of the proof is simple, the proof itself is quite
technical and lengthy. It is relegated to Appendix B. Here we provide only the basic
intuition and sketch the most important argument. It is clear that in every symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium buyers do not bid higher than their valuation. The more
interesting part is to show that in every symmetric equilibrium buyers bid almost surely
higher than zD. We denote by z¤ the lower bound of the support of a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium:







The proof proceeds by contradiction. We assume that there exists a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium for which z¤ · zD: We consider a deviation strategy of an arbitrary
bidder i, which shifts the probability mass of an interval Z"
¤ := [z¤;z¤ + ") to the point
z¤ + " and show that for a su±ciently small " > 0 the deviation is pro¯table. Thus we
reach a contradiction to the equilibrium assumption.
Revenue and average trade volume
Theorem 4 states that the supports of the rationalizable strategy sets in the uniform
price and the discriminatory auction are disjoint in the two-bidder case. In Theorem 6,
we further argue that in the general case the supports of the symmetric mixed strategy
eqilibrium sets in the two auctions are disjoint. Bidders submit higher bids in the uniform
price auction with a probability of one. As a consequence of these Theorems, we obtain
a ranking of the auction formats in terms of revenue for the auctioneer and e±ciency.
16Revenue
Theorem 7 (revenue). For any given value of the marginal cost c; the expected revenue
of the uniform price auction is at least as high as that of the discriminatory auction:



















D;c) for n ¸ 2: (Rn)
Expected revenue in the uniform price auction is strictly higher when positive quantities
of the good are traded.
Proof. The uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue because bids are
higher. For c < zD positive quantities will be traded both in the uniform price and the














The proof of (R2) is analogous; apply Theorems 4 and 1. For c > zD there will be no
trade in the discriminatory auction. If there are bids in the uniform price auction, which
exceed c; then at least one of them will be served, and the uniform price auction will again
be strictly more pro¯table. If all bids in the uniform price auction are below c; then there
will be no trade in the two auction formats. This is the only case in which the uniform
price and the discriminatory auction will generate the same revenue.
Average trade volume











11Average trading quantity can be taken in this setting also as an e±ciency measure. Note that buyers
are only served when v ¸ c since they submit bids not higher than v and the seller does not serve bids
below c. This means that trade takes place only when desirable ex-post. The mechanism which induces a
higher probability for sale, i.e. higher average turnover, can, therefore, be considered as the more e±cient
mechanism. We have to point out, however, that higher average turnover does not necessarily imply
higher e±ciency in Pareto sense or ex-ante higher sum of the surplus of market participants.
17Theorem 8 (average trade quantity). If the marginal cost distribution function is convex
(F 00 ¸ 0), the average trade quantity in the uniform price auction is higher than that in
the discriminatory auction:
(a) for all rationalizable strategies in the two-bidder case
Q
U(¾U) > Q












D) for n ¸ 2: (En)
Proof. Recall that P(q;x) denotes the probability with which the seller will sell quantity
q if the vector of bids is x. The average quantity sold in the uniform price auction can be
expressed as a function of the ordered bids:
QU(x) = QU(¿(x)) =
n X
q=1






The last equality implies that we need to sum only over the elements ¿q(x) for which
c+
q > c¡
q , as otherwise P(q;x) = 0. We write these quantities in an ascending order
l1;l2;:::;lh and obtain
¿l1(x) > ¿l2(x) > ¢¢¢ > ¿lh(x):
For the sake of brevity, we will further write ¿lk instead of ¿lk(x): We will show that
QU(¿l1;¿l2;:::;¿lh) ¸ QU(¿l2;¿l2;:::;¿lh): (3.5)




l2 and recall that c
¡
l1 is a solution of the equation
l1 ¢ (¿l1 ¡ c
¡
l1) = l2 ¢ (¿l2 ¡ c
¡
l1); (3.6)





































































































prove (3.5). The above argument can be applied iteratively (h ¡ 1) times to verify the
inequality
QU(¿l1;¿l2;:::¿lh) ¸ QU(¿lh;¿lh;:::¿lh):
























The proof of (E2) is analogous (apply Theorem 4).
19A numerical example
We consider the following two bidder example: v = 1 and the marginal cost of the auc-












































Figure 5: Numerical example: v = 1, n = 2 and f(c) = 1 for c 2 [0;1]. The supports of the
rationalizable strategy sets in the two auction forms (the pattern areas) are disjoint.
Bids in the uniform price auction are higher with a probability of one.
In the discriminatory auction the two bidders bid zD = 1
2 with a probability of one.
This is their only rationalizable strategy. The support of all rationalizable strategies in





This is illustrated in Figure 5. The average trade quantities of the discriminatory auction









20Seller's revenue is clearly higher in the uniform price auction. The payo® of bidder i in





> > > > > > <
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+ (1 ¡ x¡i)(2x¡i ¡ xi) for 2x¡i ¸ xi ¸ x¡i,
(1 ¡ xi)(2xi ¡ x¡i) for
x¡i
2 · xi < x¡i,
0 for xi <
x¡i
2 .
















Figure 6: Best responses and pure strategy equilibria (the thick dots) in the uniform price
and the discriminatory auctions. The support of the rationalizable strategies of the
uniform price auction lies within the square as has been proven in Theorem 4.
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16g for x¡i = 3
4,
x¡i+2
4 for x¡i 2 (3
4;1].
For that numerical example the uniform price auction has two asymmetric subgame per-











; i = 1;2:








Seller's revenue is clearly higher in the uniform price auction.
4 Discussion
This paper presents a highly stylized model of competitive bidding in which the seller
controls supply ex post. The main result is that the endogenous supply decision, combined
with uncertainty about seller's marginal cost, creates a greater tendency for bids to rise
in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. To what extent does this
tendency apply to more general settings?
Key element of the comparisons is the assumption that all bidders share the same
valuation. This assumption leads to low revenue in the discriminatory auction. Intuitively,
the purpose of holding a discriminatory auction is the discrimination among bidders. Price
discrimination does not materialize here because all bidders bid the same amount. This
result is robust to small di®erences in the information bidders may have about the common
value of the good. As long as bidders' valuations are close, bids will also be close and
the discriminatory auction will be inferior from seller's viewpoint. A more signi¯cant
disparity in the valuations will of course favor the discriminatory auction.
The assumption that bidders demand and can acquire only one unit does not seem to
be signi¯cant on its own. If a bidder desires several units and values each of these units
equally, then bids in the discriminatory auction will be the same as in the single-unit
case. This holds true because the payo® of each bidder does not depend on the bids of
the other bidders. We can show also for the uniform price auction that, if a bidder can
bid for more than one unit, and values all units equally, then he will submit equal bids
for all desired units. Di®erent results are obtained when demand is downward sloping. In
the discriminatory auction, for instance, bidders will not bid the same price for each unit.
Such a scenario is analyzed in Nautz (1995) and Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997), however
in these models price is not determined endogenously.
Higher bids in the uniform price auction result from the interplay of two factors {
uncertainty about marginal cost and seller's pro¯t maximizing decision. Without uncer-
tainty it is easy to see that in the two auctions all bidders will submit bids equal to the
22marginal cost. Seller's pro¯t accrues from bidders' uncertainty in both the uniform price
and the discriminatory auction. Uncertainty is more bene¯cial to the seller in the uniform
price auction format because of seller's pro¯t-maximizing behavior. This result might be
an important guide for empirical studies.
What is the role of the constant marginal cost assumption in the analysis? If marginal
cost were increasing, in the discriminatory auction the seller would generally want to
service only a subset of the bidders. In this case bidders' decisions in the discriminatory
auction would no longer be independent of other bidders' behavior, and there would
be competition among bidders. How equilibria would look like would depend on the
way the uncertainty is modelled. The basic intuition seems to carry over: raising a
bid raises the winning chances in the two auctions in a similar way, but is more costly
in the discriminatory auction. This informal argument favors uniform pricing. Providing
equilibrium existence results and obtaining closed form solutions for equilibrium bids does
not seem to be feasible and contains a host of new problems. As pointed out in Lengwiler
(1999), this makes the assumption of elastic supply analytically attractive. In a recent
contribution, LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) show that the seller can raise his revenues in the
uniform price auction by committing to an increasing supply schedule. The decision on
supply in this model, however, is not dependent on the bids.
Our analysis focused on the uniform price and the discriminatory auctions, but can the
seller learn bidders' value by having them cross-report? If a voluntary report of the value
of other bidders has no consequences for the payo® of the reporting bidder, then there is
no guarantee that bidders will report truthfully. Bidders can coordinate on collectively
reporting a value which is much lower than v, and this will be an equilibrium. And even
if they fail to report the same value, the most unfavorable consequence for them is limited
to the situation in which they do not obtain an item. It can also be questioned whether
the seller can really commit not to serve individual bidders if this lowers his pro¯ts. So,
the seller's potential to extract information by cross-reporting does not seem that great
in such a variable supply setting.
5 Conclusion
The standard pricing techniques, the uniform pricing rule and the price discrimination
rule, are widely used by monopolists for the simultaneous sale of multiple units. When
a monopolist lacks information about demand, these pricing techniques often take the
form of an auction, in which the seller ¯rst collects bids from prospective customers and
then decides on a supply quantity so as to maximize pro¯t. These auction forms, called
variable supply multi-unit auctions, are used on various markets ranging from Treasury
bills and IPOs to emission permits and electricity. They di®er from the ¯xed supply
23multi-unit auctions in the sense that the seller participates in the price-setting process
as he controls the supply after the bidding. We modelled this scenario as a two-stage
game and compared these variable supply pricing mechanisms. We found that due to
the uncertainty about supply in a symmetric equilibrium the bidders bid higher in the
uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. This ¯nding further implies
that the uniform price auction is more pro¯table for the seller and leads to higher average
trade volume.
The following intuition helps explain our results. In the discriminatory auction, the
winning probability of each bidder is not a®ected by the bids of his fellow bidders, as
the seller optimally serves every bid above his marginal cost. Since the bidders share
the same valuation, they submit equal bids. Thus, as in Lengwiler (1999), the right of
the seller to discriminate among bidders and charge di®erent prices has no bite. Bidders
in the discriminatory auction do not compete at all; in the reduced form of the game a
bidder's expected payo® is independent of how other bidders bid. In the uniform price
auction, on the other hand, the probability of winning as well as the ¯nal price depend
on all bids. Submitting higher bids in this auction format proves to be pro¯table as it
raises the probability of winning, but not necessarily the price a bidder has to pay. This
simple observation is employed to demonstrate that the uniform price auction induces a
more competitive environment and leads to higher equilibrium bids for any number of
bidders (see Theorems 4 and 6). Our results are derived without the need to compute the
equilibria precisely. Rather, we exploited the properties of the bidders' payo® functions
and the equilibrium and rationalizability concepts.
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24A Appendix
Proof of property (v) of Theorem 2: There exists ± > 0 such that
@iR
U
i (xi;x¡i) > 0 for x¡i < xi < minfx¡i + ±;zUg:












i (yi + y¡i;y¡i)
where for yi = 0 we mean the derivative from above. Notice that we simply expressed the
partial derivative as a function of y¡i = x¡i and the di®erence yi = xi¡x¡i. The function




points where the partial derivative is strictly positive is open12 in K with f0g£[0;zU] µ H:
Therefore, as [0;zU] is compact, there exists13 a neighborhood [0;±], ± > 0, of 0 in [0;
v¡zU
2 ]
with [0;±] £ [0;zU] µ H:
Proof of Theorem 4:





= 0 for all ¾ 2 §
U:
For each ¾ 2 §, de¯ne ^ ¾ 2 § by








¢ 1v2B for B 2 B;
which means, a bidder with strategy ^ ¾ bids v whenever a bidder with strategy ¾ would
submit a bid from the interval (v;m]. We ¯rst remark that ^ ¾ always weakly dominates
¾, as bids above v lead to a strictly negative outcome when served. So a strategy ¾i of




> 0 will never be a best response to a strategy ¾¡i of player ¡i,
if player i has to pay more than v with strictly positive probability when the strategy
combination (¾i;¾¡i) is played.
Using this property, we will now show by induction that, with the notation of De¯ni-
tion 2, for k = 1;2;:::
¾i = 2 §
U;k





We start with k = 1. As the other bid is never greater than m, bids from the inter-
12Here we use the fact that pre-images of open sets under continuous mappings are open, see e.g.
KÄ onigsberger (2002), p. 16.






are served when the marginal cost of the seller is below v, which






> 0, ^ ¾i will be strictly better than ¾i, regardless of what ¡i does.
Now assume that equation (A.1) holds for k¡1. Bids above maxfv;2¡kmg are served
when the other bidder does not submit a bid above maxfv;2¡(k¡1)mg and the cost is
below v, which by induction happens with strictly positive probability if the other bidder
plays a strategy from §
U;k¡1





the strategy b ¾i will be a strictly better response to any element of §
U;k¡1
¡i , which proves
(A.1) for k.





= 0 for all ¾ 2 §
U:
Recall that






We will iteratively show that
§
U;k
i µ f¾i j ¾i(Jk) = 0g; for k = 1;2;::;N;i = 1;2; (A.2)
which is su±cient to prove the Lemma. Observe that (A.2) trivially holds for k = 0.
Assume that it holds for k ¡ 1 < N for player ¡i. We will show that
§
U;k
i µ f¾i j ¾i(Jk) = 0g: (A.3)
Assume on the contrary
9¾i 2 §
U;k
i with ¾i(Ik) > 0: (A.4)
We will now demonstrate that for each ¾¡i 2 conv§
U;(k¡1)
¡i there exists ^ ¾i such that
RU
i (^ ¾i;¾¡i) ¸ RU
i (¾i;¾¡i). This will pose a contradiction to the above assumption (A.4),
namely that ¾i is a best response to some mixed strategy from the set conv§
U;(k¡1)
¡i .
Case 1: ¾¡i(J2k) > 0:
26Consider the strategy ^ ¾i :
^ ¾i (B) = ¾i (B \ CIk) + ¾i (Ik) ¢ 1k±2B for B 2 B;
where CIk is the complement set of Ik (CIk ´ MnIk):
R
U



















































(A.6) follows from (A.5) because we assumed that (A.2) holds for (k ¡ 1) < N
for player ¡i. Further, from Theorem 2 follows that
R
U
i (xi;x¡i) < R
U
i (k±;x¡i) if xi 2 Ik and (k ¡ 1) ¢ ± · x¡i < 2k±;
R
U
i (xi;x¡i) · R
U
i (k±;x¡i) if xi 2 Ik and (k ¡ 1) ¢ ± · x¡i:
As by assumption ¾¡i(J2k) > 0 the inequality (A.7) is also valid.
Case 2: ¾¡i(J2k) = 0: For the strategy ^ ¾i; where
^ ¾i (B) = ¾i (B \ CIk) + ¾i (Ik) ¢ 1 3v




































d¾i(xi)d¾¡i(x¡i) > 0: (A.8)
The inequality (A.8) holds because RU
i (3v
4 ;x¡i) > 0 for x¡i 2 [0;v].
Proof of Lemma 1: RU
i (x) is continuous in x:
Let x be an arbitrary bid vector. We will show that for any sequence of bid vectors
x(k), k = 1;2;:::, with x(k) ! x we have RU
i (x(k)) ! RU





0 ¡ abcj · ja
0 ¡ aj ¢ b
0c
0 + a ¢ jb
0 ¡ bj ¢ c
0 + ab ¢ jc
0 ¡ cj;



































¢ P(q;x) ¢ j1f'
x(k)(i)·qg ¡ 1f'x(i)·qgj:
This inequality can be interpreted as a decomposition of the change in expected payo® of
bidder i into a price e®ect, a quantity e®ect and an allocation e®ect. As sums, di®erences,
products, quotients, minimums and maximums of continuous functions are continuous, so
are the functions c¡
q (¢), c+





¯ ! 0; jP(q;x
(k)) ¡ P(q;x)j ! 0
for k ! 1, which means price and quantity e®ect tend to 0. To complete the proof, we






¢ P(q;x) ¢ j1f'
x(k)(i)·qg ¡ 1f'x(i)·qgj;
where
Lx = fq j ¿q(x) > ¿q+1(x)g
because P(q;x) = 0 for q = 2 Lx:14 In words, one needs to sum only over the positions in
the announced demand curve for which an increase in quantity leads to a decrease in the
stopout price. This holds true because if several bids are equal, the seller serves with a
probability of one either none or all of them. Observe now that there exists k0, such that









i if xj > xi for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng: (A.9)
Then the inequalities
'x(i) · q and 'x(k)(i) · q
14One observes that c¡
q = ¿q and c+
q · ¿q. Hence P(q;x) = 0.
28are equivalent for q 2 Lx and k ¸ k0, which completes the proof.
B Appendix
In this Appendix we prove Theorem 6: in every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of
the uniform price auction buyers bid with probability one higher than zD (the equilibrium
bid in the discriminatory auction). First we provide some auxiliary statements in the
form of several Lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let L(x¡i) :=
£
0; min(fxj j j 6= ig [ fzDg)
¢
.
(i) For any i and any given x¡i, the partial derivative @iRi(xi;x¡i) exists in all but
¯nitely many points xi 2 L(x¡i).
(ii) The partial derivative of the bidder that submitted the lowest bid is nonnegative if
that bidder submitted a bid not higher than zD: Formally, for any x¡i
@iR
U
i (xi;x¡i) ¸ 0;
for all xi 2 L(x¡i) for which @iRU
i exists.
(iii) The partial derivative of the bidder that submitted the lowest bid is uniformly bounded
away from 0 if that bidder submitted a bid not higher than zD and is served with
positive probability. Formally, there exists @ > 0 such that for any x¡i
@iR
U
i (xi;x¡i) > @
for all xi 2 L(x¡i) for which @iRU
i exists and c
+
i (xi;x¡i) > 0.
Proof. (i) The expected payo® of bidder i is given by
R
U


























^ q(x)¿^ q(x)(x) ¡ nxi
^ q(x) ¡ n
:
29We will now show that ^ q(xi;x¡i) is almost everywhere di®erentiable in xi and as a conse-
quence so will be c+
n(xi;x¡i). Since ^ q(xi;x¡i), as a function of xi, takes only ¯nitely many
integer values, monotonicity will be su±cient for it to be piecewise constant and therefore
di®erentiable in all but ¯nitely many points. So, to complete the proof, we will show that




i, let q0 := ^ q(x0
i;x¡i) and
q00 := ^ q(x00
i;x¡i), and assume by contradiction that q0 < q00. Observe that according to the


















































































(ii) For all c
+
i (xi;x¡i) · 0; we have RU
i (xi;x¡i) = 0 and thus @iRU
i (xi;x¡i) = 0: For the
case c
+
i (xi;x¡i) > 0 see the next part.
(iii) By assumption there are bids strictly higher than xi, therefore ^ q(x) ¸ 1 and c+
n(x) <
xi. Let f := minc2[0;¹ c] f(c). As f is continuous and strictly positive in the interval [0;¹ c] we
have f > 0. Recall also that F=f is increasing by assumption. Because c+
n(x) < xi < zD,
30the following (in)equalities are valid for all points in which the partial derivative exists:
@iR
U

















































































Observe that @ > 0 because










Lemma 3. For any x 2 [0;v]n and any " > 0 for which xi+" · v the following inequality
holds:
Ri(xi + ";x¡i) ¡ Ri(xi;x¡i) ¸ ¡1 ¢ ":
Proof. The inequality applies because an increase in the bid of bidder i can lead to an
increase in the stop-out price (with some probability), but does not lower the winning
chances of that bidder.
Lemma 4. Let x be such that there exists x with x · xj < n
n¡1 ¢ x for all j. Then
c+





nx ¡ (n ¡ 1) ¢ n
n¡1 ¢ x
n ¡ n + 1
= 0:
Lemma 5. If all bidders except one (say, bidder i) submit a bid of x 2 [0;v) (that means,
xj = x for j 6= i) then there exist " > 0 and e @ > 0 such that for xi 2 [x;x + ") the
following holds:15 @iRU















15For xi = x we mean the derivative from above.
31we obtain the partial derivative function
@iR
U

























which is continuous in xi. As @iRU
i (x;x;:::;x) = (v ¡x)¢f(x) > 0, there exist " > 0 and
e @ > 0 such that @iRU
i (xi;x;:::;x) > e @ for xi 2 [x;x + ").
Lemma 6. Let x be such that there exist bidders i, j, k with xi ¸ xk and







i (x) = 0:








'x(i)(x) ¸ n ¢ xk ¡ (n ¡ 1) ¢ xi:
The identities
xi ¢ (n ¡ 1) ¡ xj
n ¡ 2
< n ¢ xk ¡ (n ¡ 1) ¢ xi ,
xi ¢ (n ¡ 1) ¡ xj < n ¢ (n ¡ 2) ¢ xk ¡ (n ¡ 2) ¢ (n ¡ 1) ¢ xi ,
xj > (n ¡ 1)
2 ¢ xi ¡ n ¢ (n ¡ 2) ¢ xk ,
xj > (n ¡ 1)
2 ¢ xi ¡ [(n ¡ 1)
2 ¡ 1] ¢ xk ,







'x(i)(x) for xj > xk + (n ¡ 1)2(xi ¡ xk);
which completes the proof. With these preliminaries we can prove now Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6.












bound of the support of the bidders' strategies in that equilibrium. Assume by contra-
diction z¤ · zD. Take an arbitrary bidder i and consider a deviation strategy ¾"
i, which
16If bidder i submits also a bid of xk, we choose 'x so that bidder i obtains a number lower than bidder
k.
32only shifts the probability mass of the small interval Z"
¤ = [z¤;z¤ +") to the point z¤ +":
¾
"












¢ 1fz¤+"2Bg for B 2 B:
We will show that, for " small enough, this deviation strategy will be more pro¯table
































n¡1; Z¤ = fz¤g
n¡1:
Then we break down the set Z into the following four sets: Z n Z", Z" n (Z"
0 [ Z¤), Z"
0
and Z¤: In the case of n = 3 bidders, taken from the perspective of bidder 3, all these
























































































For " > 0 small enough, we obtain lower bounds of the four terms by using Lemma 3 for
the ¯rst term, Lemmas 2 [(i)&(ii)] and Lemma 6 for the second one, Lemmas 2 [(i)&(iii)]
and Lemma 4 for the third one17 and Lemma 5 for the fourth term, which leads us to the
following (in)equalities.
17Lemma 4 guarantees that in the considered set c+
































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: The pattern ares represent the sets Z (upper-left), Z" (upper-right), Z nZ" (middle-
left), Z" n (Z"
0 [ Z¤) (middle-right), Z¤ (lower-left) and Z"






















































































We will prove that for su±ciently small " > 0 the expression in the last line is positive.



















































= 0 for all " > 0. In this case ¾¤
¡i(Z¤) > 0; because
z¤ was assumed to be the lower bound of the symmetric equilibrium mixed strategy. In
either case we can state the existence of an " > 0 for which the expression in the last line






¡i) > 0, which completes the proof.
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